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TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS 
DEBORAH L. RHODE* 
Teaching professional responsibility poses special challenges; so too, does 
writing about it.  I have generally avoided the topic out of concern that advice 
might seem presumptuous or platitudinous, and that too much candor about 
prior follies might depress or discourage new entrants to the field.  I can still 
recall a teaching workshop on legal ethics at which I and other battle-hardened 
veterans amused our audience with disasters we had aided and abetted.  At one 
end of the spectrum were the death marches through moral philosophy—the 
functional equivalent of Cliffs Notes on Kant.  At the other end were bar 
preparation courses for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam—legal 
ethics without the ethics.  And in the middle were many valiant attempts to 
present real moral dilemmas and regulatory issues that bumped up against 
student resistance or constraints of classroom size and format.  The impression 
created was that, like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, all professional 
responsibility courses could be unhappy in their own way. 
Such confessions may have been good for the soul and may have saved 
some members of the audience from replicating our own sins of omission and 
commission.  But the net effect may also have been unduly dispiriting.  The 
challenges of teaching professional responsibility are significant, but so too are 
the rewards.  The questions at issue truly matter for the lives our students will 
live, the profession they will constitute, and the public they will serve.  So 
helping each other teach this course well also matters.  We have an opportunity 
to influence the ethical compass of those who will shape our legal, 
commercial, and policy settings.  We owe it to them, to ourselves, and to the 
broader community to share and reassess our educational strategies.  In that 
spirit, let me offer a few comments based both on my reading of the literature 
and on a quarter century’s experience teaching with varied formats in schools 
with somewhat different cultures. 
 
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director, Center on Ethics, Stanford University.  
B.A., J.D. Yale University.  The comments of Stephen Gillers and Bruce Green are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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I.  OBJECTIVES 
My goals for the course are ambitious, but not atypical.  The first is to 
build understanding of the legal standards and regulatory processes governing 
lawyers’ conduct.1  A related objective is to help students recognize and 
analyze ethical issues in light of those standards and broader moral 
frameworks.2  Future practitioners need to know where the lines are before 
they are in a position to cross one.  But they also need to consider where the 
lines should be, and how they will address issues on which the profession’s 
rules are ambiguous or leave ample room for discretion.  Building students’ 
capacity for reflective judgment should be a central objective of any course on 
professional responsibility.3  Although no classroom setting can fully simulate 
the pressures of practice, students can be urged to consider recurrent ethical 
dilemmas against a realistic social backdrop in which peer pressures, client 
loyalties, financial considerations, and moral convictions may tug in different 
directions.  There is something to be said for having future practitioners 
confront such questions before they have a vested interest in coming out one 
way rather than another. 
To promote informed analysis, some introduction of interdisciplinary 
perspectives can be useful.  An understanding of the logic and limitations of 
professional regulatory structures requires a corresponding understanding of 
market failures, bar politics, and the difficulties of collective action.4  An 
evaluation of standards governing confidentiality, client loyalty, and related 
issues can proceed at a more sophisticated level if students have some 
 
 1. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992); Bruce 
A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 362–
65 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Less is More]; Bruce A. Green, Teaching Lawyers Ethics, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1091 (2007). 
 2. Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for a 
Deliberative Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1339–41 (1992); Douglas N. Frenkel, 
On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19, 31 (2001); Thomas D. Morgan, Use of 
the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409, 409 (1998). 
 3. Croft, supra note 2, at 1341; Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a 
Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in 
Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 520 (2003); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good 
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 39 (1995). 
 4. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 728–29, 777 (4th ed. 2004); 
David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very 
Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 206 (2004); 
Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the 
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 433 (2001); Roger C. 
Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 160–61 (1997). 
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familiarity with the central traditions of moral reasoning.5  The challenges of 
ethical decision-making become clearer if students have some exposure to 
cognitive bias, organizational culture, situational influence, and additional 
emotional and psychological factors that can impair judgment.6  Although no 
single course can do justice to all of this material, some basic insights on 
selected issues can enrich coverage. 
For example, recent financial scandals can be the occasion for exploring 
both the psychological predispositions and organizational pathologies that 
contribute to fraud.  These include both lawyers’ and clients’ tendencies 
toward overconfidence and the suppression of dissonant information.7  An 
escalation of commitment to choices that turn out to be wrong, either factually 
or morally, can lead to ever more dubious conduct.8  In organizational contexts 
where responsibility for a final decision is diffused, and financial and peer 
pressure work against questioning client choices, the result may be the moral 
meltdowns recently on display in Enron et al.9  Enabling students to recognize 
the cognitive and structural forces that compromise moral judgment may 
inform their individual decision-making.  It may also assist them as advisors, 
regulators, and policy makers in designing institutional checks and balances 
that will address those compromising influences. 
 
 5. See, for example, the overview of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue-based theories 
and their application to legal ethics issues in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 8–12, 389–403. 
 6. For an overview of the literature on cognitive bias, see Michael B. Metzger, Bridging the 
Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics Education, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 435 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317 (2006).  
For organizational culture, see generally the sources cited in ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: 
THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 429–57; 
John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF 
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 17 (David M. Messick & Ann E. 
Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Rhode, supra.  For situational influences, see LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. 
NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 42–49 
(1991).  For the role of emotions in moral behavior, see Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and 
Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 
817–18 (2001); Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social 
Psychology Teach Us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, 
Choices, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643, 671–74 (2004). 
 7. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: 
Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 971 (2002); 
David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision 
Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 9, 19 (1996); Metzger, supra note 6, at 478–79, 493. 
 8. See Darley, supra note 6, at 21. 
 9. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1186–87 (2005); David Luban, Making Sense of Moral 
Meltdowns, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND 
POLICY 57, 69–73 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Where Is the Leadership in 
Moral Leadership, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, 
AND POLICY 1, 27–30 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006). 
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A final objective of many professional responsibility courses, my own 
included, is to encourage future lawyers to think more deeply about the kind of 
life they want to lead, the profession they want to serve, and how both can 
contribute to their vision of a just society.10  For some students, this will be 
their only classroom opportunity to consider how future choices about jobs, 
clients, public service, and social responsibility will match the values that sent 
them to law school in the first instance.11  A wide range of materials can assist 
that reflective process, such as descriptions of the conditions of practice, the 
urgency of problems related to access to justice, the rewards of pro bono work, 
and the career paths of exemplary lawyers.  Surveys of young attorneys 
consistently find that their greatest dissatisfaction with their professional work 
is its lack of connection to the social good.12  Getting new entrants to the bar to 
think systematically about how to mesh their principles with their practice is 
one step toward addressing that frustration. 
Considerable evidence also indicates that a growing number of 
professionals would like a better work/life balance and would be happier with 
a different trade-off between income and hours than that now prevailing in 
many practice settings.13  Excessive work demands are a major cause of 
physical and mental health difficulties and related performance problems, as 
well as inadequate time for pro bono work.14  An informed discussion of these 
issues may encourage students not to settle, at least not in the long run, for a 
 
 10. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 159–60; Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Law School as 
a Culture of Conversation: Re-imagining Legal Education as a Process of Conversion to the 
Demands of Authentic Conversation, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 333, 363–64 (1997); Howard Lesnick, 
Being a Teacher, of Lawyers: Discerning the Theory of My Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1101 
(1992); Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 583, 591–92 (1998). 
 11. See Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3, at 498. 
 12. See AM. BAR ASS’N YOUNG LAW. DIV., CAREER SATISFACTION 21, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/yld/satisfaction_800.doc (last visited May 20, 2007). 
 13. A variety of authors have noted the evidence provided by surveys.  See SUSAN SAAB 
FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT 
17 (2005) (noting that over seventy percent of supervised attorney respondents reported moderate 
to major problems in finding time for family needs and other non-work activities); DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 26 (2000) 
[hereinafter RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE]; Jonathan Clements, Money and Happiness: 
Here’s Why You Won’t Laugh All the Way to the Bank, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2006, at D1; 
Stephanie Francis Ward, the Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off, ABA J., Feb. 2007, at 24; Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 
1908, 1910 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives for Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2207, 
2208, 2212 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, Balanced Lives]. 
 14. For health difficulties, see FORTNEY, supra note 13, at 25–27; Rhode, Balanced Lives, 
supra note 13, at 2208–09.  For the impact of billable hour quotas on pro bono work, see 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE 
PROFESSIONS 132–35 (2004). 
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practice setting that leaves too little time for family, friends, and causes to 
which they are committed.  Making future practitioners more aware of how 
different legal employers accommodate family and pro bono commitments and 
how those accommodations affect lawyers’ satisfaction may help build support 
for workplace reform. 
Not all of these objectives can be fully realized in any single course.  
Professors will make different choices about where to concentrate attention 
and what trade-offs to make between depth and breadth.  But this agenda 
identifies the range of issues that schools should aim to address somewhere in 
their professional responsibility curricula. 
II.  CHALLENGES 
How often legal ethics courses succeed with an ambitious agenda is 
anyone’s guess, but a safe answer is probably much less often than their 
professors would like.  The consensus among experts in professional 
responsibility is that courses in the subject are among the most difficult to 
teach.15  There are a number of reasons why, and the problems are not all 
readily surmounted. 
The first involves a mismatch between institutional resources, student 
expectations, and faculty aspirations.16  A threshold difficulty is that most 
schools meet accreditation standards requiring instruction in professional 
responsibility through a single upper-level mandatory course.17  Some schools 
provide insufficient units, curricular choices, or manageable class sizes to 
minimize student resistance and reinforce the importance of the topic.  After 
the first year, students expect electives, and a required class in a subject they 
may not want with a professor they would not choose is bound to evoke some 
backlash.18  As Stephen Gillers notes, those with little experience in the legal 
world they are about to inhabit may fail to see the personal relevance or market 
value of professional responsibility courses.19  The problem is compounded by 
the skepticism that many students bring to discussions about ethics in general 
 
 15. Stephen Gillers, “Eat Your Spinach?”, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1215, 1219 (2007); Frenkel, 
supra note 2, at 22; Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 38; Green, Less is More, supra note 1, 
at 358; Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics 
Courses: A Dialogue About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457, 457, 459–60 (1998); Cramton 
& Koniak, supra note 4, at 146–47; William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1991). 
 16. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 147–48; Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 38–
39. 
 17. The ABA’s accreditation standard requires instruction in “the history, goals, structure, 
values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.”  ABA STANDARDS 
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(5) (2006). 
 18. See Gillers, supra note 15, at 1219. 
 19. Id.; see Frenkel, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing student resistance generally). 
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and legal ethics in particular.  As educators have long noted, law schools’ 
reliance on quasi-Socratic teaching tends to foster a cynical or relativist 
response to moral issues.20  The strong message is that “there is always an 
argument the other way, and the Devil usually has a very good case.”21  This 
stance makes some students especially skeptical about the value of classroom 
discussion of values.  If everyone’s position has a plausible counter position, 
what is the point of debate?  To the most cynical observers, the bar’s 
requirements of ethics instruction and a muliti-state ethics exam seem designed 
mainly to shore up the profession’s public image and should be satisfied with 
the least effort possible.22 
These students are predisposed to view any classroom agenda, beyond 
preparation for the bar exam, as a waste of time.  They start the course 
interested only in the law of lawyering that examiners test.23  At least initially, 
they resist attempts to raise issues of personal values and professional identity.  
They do not want to hear their classmates mouthing off about “mushy pap.”24  
Nor are all students interested in a candid discussion of moral ambiguity or the 
dark side of practice.  Ethical uncertainty is an uncomfortable state.25  And 
those who have already committed to a particular practice setting may not 
welcome rain on their parade.26  Their response to the introduction of 
disquieting messages may be to shoot the messenger.  Even those students who 
are less resistant to the subject matter may lack sufficient experience with legal 
practice to engage in the contextual analysis necessary for informed ethical 
decision-making. 
So too, some professional responsibility teachers may be uncomfortable 
initiating value-laden discussions in which they have no special legal expertise.  
Many faculty are understandably wary of appearing to pontificate from the 
podium or to denigrate a practice structure that their students are at pains to 
enter.  As William Simon notes, “Ethics teachers in professional schools worry 
about their credibility with students.  Their students aspire to be practitioners.  
The teachers do not . . . [and] their knowledge of the circumstances of practice 
 
 20. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 247, 262 (1978); Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 
878–79 (1985); Alan Hirsch, The Moral Failure of Law Schools, WASH. L. & POL., June 1998, at 
29; Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two 
Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 523–25 (1982). 
 21. Macaulay, supra note 20, at 524. 
 22. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 151–53. 
 23. Id. at 153–54. 
 24. Id. at 145; see also Frenkel, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 25. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
63, 73–83 (1980); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. 
RTS. 1 (1976) (providing some of the classic accounts of lawyers’ discomfort with an unsettled 
moral universe). 
 26. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 203. 
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is limited . . . .27  Other professors are skeptical about the ability of any single 
course to affect values that may already be well developed by the time 
individuals reach law school.  Even faculty who would like to engage deeper 
moral questions may find themselves with a class too large to encourage 
candid dialogue on these issues. 
Yet professors who avoid these problems by teaching to the bar exam often 
end up disappointing themselves and the great majority of their students.  The 
reasons are rooted in the design of the exam and emerged clearly in a panel 
discussion I once had with one of its architects.  In response to concerns that 
the test’s multiple choice format trivialized ethical issues, he explained that the 
only affordable alternative was worse.28  The essay questions that preceded the 
multi-state format and focused on important questions failed to yield a curve.  
Virtually all bar applicants took the moral high road.29  By contrast, a multiple 
choice exam could test knowledge of more obscure rules and frame possible 
answers in ambiguous or counter-intuitive ways, so that a critical mass of 
poorly prepared candidates would fail.30 
To allow bar exams to dictate the agenda of professional responsibility 
courses would exclude much that is important in the field.  On many key 
issues, bar ethical rules are silent, ambiguous, or permissive.31  For example, 
under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers have 
discretion whether to disclose confidential information to prevent criminal or 
fraudulent acts, whether to withdraw from representation that has become 
repugnant, and whether to raise moral, political, or social concerns when 
counseling clients.32  Knowledge of what the rules say can only begin, not end, 
analysis of how discretion should be exercised.  Nor do the rules give adequate 
guidance on what constitutes “competent” representation or “reasonable” fees; 
much depends on context, and requires a far more nuanced analysis than is 
necessary or even helpful for passing the bar exam.33  So too, a large part of 
the law of lawyering is determined not by bar ethical standards, but by criminal 
and civil statutes, malpractice doctrine, judicial sanctions, and agency 
 
 27. William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher’s Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue and Risk 
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006). 
 28. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 41 (1992). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Of course, whether such a screening strategy excludes applicants who are most likely to 
cause ethical problems is another matter.  Few bar disciplinary actions or justifiable client 
complaints stem from ignorance of relevant rules; most involve felonies, misappropriation of 
funds, and egregious performance issues that are rooted more in behavioral and office 
management problems than lack of knowledge of bar ethical standards.  RHODE & LUBAN, supra 
note 4, at 825–27, 836. 
 31. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 201. 
 32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.16, 2.1 (2007). 
 33. See id. at R. 1.1, 1.5. 
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regulations that are beyond the scope of the exam.34  Also excluded by that test 
are an entire range of critical policy questions, such as how to improve 
professional regulatory structures, increase access to justice, and encourage pro 
bono service. 
The evolution of the bar’s code of conduct over the last century toward a 
more legalistic formulation also has made it less useful in socializing new 
entrants to the highest standards of professionalism.  Unlike its predecessors, 
the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct include little by way of 
ethical aspirations.35  Limiting a course in professional responsibility to 
statutory analysis of the Model Rules is bound to be dispiriting, particularly in 
contexts where the Rules are more responsive to professional than public 
interests.36  As David Luban and Michael Millemann put it, if a teacher “tries 
to draw her [standards] of professionalism from a de-moralized code, she is 
almost certain to become demoralized.”37  The same is obviously true for 
students.38 
Related challenges come from colleagues, who often view the field as an 
intellectual backwater, which traps participants in a misconceived mission.  
Judge Richard Posner puts a common assumption with uncommon candor: “As 
for the task of instilling ethics in law students at . . . law schools, I can think of 
few things more futile than attempting to teach people to be good.”39  Yet this 
characterization both overstates the objectives of professional responsibility 
courses and understates their influence.  I have never encountered anyone in 
 
 34. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 174; Joan L. O’Sullivan et al., Ethical 
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 110 
n.5 (1996). 
 35. The ABA’s 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility included Ethical Considerations 
along with Disciplinary Rules.  See Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 44.  The ABA’s Canons 
of Ethics were entirely aspirational.  Id.  They functioned as guidance to judicial and disciplinary 
bodies but had no legally binding force; unlike their successors, they were never promulgated as 
court rules by state supreme courts.  Id.  For a defense of this evolution, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L. J. 1239, 1258 (1991); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules 
of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 77, 84–85 (1981). 
 36. See generally RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, (discussing these 
contexts). 
 37. Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 58. 
 38. As Cramton and Koniak note, exposing students to “pedestrian and unchallenging 
instruction,” like that of bar preparation courses, may induce the kind of moral indifference that 
the legal ethics requirement is designed to counteract.  Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 154; 
see also Frenkel, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that focus only on codes “tends to produce a 
stultifying classroom.”). 
 39. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (1993).  For similar views, see Gillers, supra note 15; Peter Steinfels, 
The University’s Role in Instilling a Moral Code Among Students? None Whatever, Some Argue, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A13 (quoting Stanley Fish’s comment to his university colleagues 
that “You can’t make . . . [students] into good people and you shouldn’t try”). 
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the field of professional ethics who describes the goal of his or her course as 
“teaching people to be good.”  Nor does the evidence available suggest that the 
less grandiose objectives noted earlier, of making students more informed and 
reflective about professional responsibilities, are beyond the capacities of law 
school curricula.  Research on ethics education finds that individuals’ moral 
views and strategies change significantly during early adulthood and that well-
designed courses can improve capacities for moral reasoning.40  Many crucial 
professional responsibility issues involve tradeoffs among competing values in 
contexts that students will not have considered prior to law school.  And many 
important bar regulatory issues call on conventional techniques of policy 
analysis that are not distinctive to courses on ethics. 
Can students be convinced?  In my experience, most of them most of the 
time, with the help of strategies such as those outlined below.  Many graduates 
also wish their law school classes had given them more help in resolving the 
difficult ethical issues that confront them in practice.41  There is, moreover, 
something to be said for giving students what they will need as lawyers, 
whether or not it is what they want in law school.  But teachers of professional 
responsibility also need approaches that will reduce resistance.  The success of 
their courses will depend on how they are taught, what choices are available to 
students, and how the subject is viewed in the academic culture.  Let me close 
with some concrete strategies for meeting the challenges that teaching 
professional responsibility presents. 
III.  STRATEGIES 
Effective education in professional responsibility requires attention not 
only to courses specializing in that subject, but also to their institutional 
context.  In an ideal world, the topic would be integrated throughout the core 
curriculum and given focused attention in a range of upper-level courses, 
particularly clinics.  Students are much more likely to take the subject seriously 
if other professors do so as well and discuss ethical issues in the context of 
their own fields of expertise.42  Students pick up messages from what is 
 
 40. See sources cited in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 996–1005; Steven Hartwell, 
Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995); 
Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law 
School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 734 (1998). 
 41. Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3, at 519–20. 
 42. For the argument for curricular integration, see RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 13, at 203; Rhode, supra note 28, at 50–53.  How often this occurs is open to question.  
For a discussion of faculty resistance, see Gillers, supra note 15, at 1216–17; Marjorie L. Girth, 
Facing Ethical Issues with Law Students in an Adversary Context, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 
597 (2005).  For a discussion of law schools’ failure to give ethical issues the importance it 
deserves, see Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 146–48, 155–59; Pearce, supra note 40, at 720.  
By contrast, about “three-fourths (76%) of students indicated their school emphasized to a 
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missing or marginal in the core curriculum.  Professional responsibility courses 
are less likely to be regarded as a diversion from what is really important if the 
subject is treated with respect by the faculty as a whole. 
It is equally important to give students some choice in satisfying the 
professional responsibility requirement.  Resistance to an upper-level 
mandatory course is less likely if various options are available, including 
courses that situate ethics in particular substantive areas, such as tax, business, 
family, criminal, poverty, or public interest practice.43  These courses can add 
depth and relevance for students who have identified the field where they are 
likely to specialize. 
One especially effective approach is to link professional responsibility with 
clinical courses or externships.  The best way to improve ethical judgment is 
generally through engagement with real problems, involving real clients.  As 
Luban and Millemann note, moral decision-making involves more than 
knowledge of relevant rules and principles; it also demands a capacity to 
understand how those rules apply and which principles are most important in 
concrete settings.44  Clinics and externships can provide the kind of 
experiential knowledge and guided reflection that are conducive to adult 
learning, particularly on ethical issues.45  When cases involve clients from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, students can gain cross-cultural competence and 
direct understanding of how the law functions or fails to function for the have-
nots.46  Such exposure brings home the urgent need for pro bono service and 
greater access to justice in a way that abstract discussion cannot.  Although 
clinics and externships necessarily address ethical issues that arise in 
placements, not all clinical teachers or practice supervisors have the time, 
 
substantial degree the ethical practice of the law.”  LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT 
ENGAGEMENT, LSSSE 2004 OVERVIEW 4 (2004), available at http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/ 
lssse_2004_overview.pdf. 
 43. For a discussion of various ways that legal ethics has been incorporated into the law 
school curriculum, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998); Girth, supra note 42, at 596–97. 
 44. Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 39. 
 45. Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality”, 4 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 1, 23–25 (1998); Hartwell, supra note 40, at 522–28 (1995); James E. Moliterno, Legal 
Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
71, 81 (1997) [hereinafter Moliterno, Legal Education].  For a discussion of the value of clinics in 
teaching legal ethics, see, for example, Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law 
Practice, 75 NEB. L. REV. 684, 692–96 (1996); Peter A. Joy, The Law School Clinic as a Model 
Ethical Law Office, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (2004); Lerner, supra note 6, at 694–95; 
O’Sullivan et al., supra note 34; Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (1996).  For a discussion of the linkage to externships see Lerman, 
supra note 15, at 485; Moliterno, Legal Education, supra, at 107–17; James E. Moliterno, 
Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 402–03 (1998). 
 46. See Jane Harris Aiken, supra note 45, at 24–27. 
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interest, and expertise to provide comprehensive coverage.  Linking a 
professional responsibility course to a clinic, or building in additional units to 
focus on core topics, may be necessary to ensure systematic treatment 
regardless of what happens to surface in a given semester. 
Of course, not all law schools will have sufficient faculty resources to 
provide most professional responsibility instruction through clinical 
opportunities or specialized “ethics and . . .” courses.  When most students will 
satisfy their requirement in a professional responsibility survey course, it is 
helpful if they have some choice among instructors and format.  It is also 
desirable to avoid large classes.  Candid discussion on personal, value-laden 
issues becomes increasingly difficult once enrollment gets over a certain size.  
But whatever the size, student engagement is likely to be greater if the course 
includes exercises involving hypothetical problems, role simulations, and 
breakouts into small groups.47  Although these exercises lack the immediacy 
provided in clinics or externships, they permit more systematic, sequential 
coverage of a wider range of issues for larger numbers of students.48  As 
experts have long recognized, such interactive approaches are more effective 
than pure lectures in promoting sustained learning.49 
Other materials are also helpful in supplementing a basic textbook.  Clips 
from movies, television, and filmed vignettes can be effective in providing 
context and catalysts for class discussion, and their vividness is likely to 
enhance attention as well as retention.50  Literary portraits can also push 
conversations to a deeper level and invite students to bring non-legal 
perspectives to issues that have relevance for legal practitioners.51  For 
 
 47. Lerner, supra note 6, at 695–96. 
 48. See Girth, supra note 42, at 604; see also Moliterno, Legal Education, supra note 45, at 
107–17 (discussing the use of simulations); Morgan, supra note 2, 413–19 (1998) (discussing the 
value of problems). 
 49. See the literature summarized in DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE: 
SCHOLARS, STATUS AND ACADEMIC CULTURE (forthcoming 2007); Hartwell, supra note 40.  For 
one of the early, classic accounts, see Carl R. Rogers, Toward a Theory of Creativity, 11 ETC: A 
REV. OF GEN. SEMANTICS 249, 256 (1954) (noting that the only learning that really sticks is that 
which is self- discovered). 
 50. John Batt, Law, Science and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, Electronic Media, 
Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19 (1990); Frenkel, supra note 2, at 36; Videotape: 
Stephen Gillers Adventures in Legal Ethics (N.Y.U School of Law 1994) (on file with the Saint 
Louis University Omer Poos Law Library) (including a wide range of well-done scenarios); see 
also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers: Lawyering in Literature, 
Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and Craft, 31 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2000) (pointing to television, film, and literature as sources of discussion 
topics). 
 51. For a discussion of the value of narrative in legal ethics education and a wide range of 
examples, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories 
to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2001).  For a discussion of the value of 
literature as an educational strategy more generally, see ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES: 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1054 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1043 
example, Leo Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan Ilych and Margaret Edson’s Pulitizer 
Prize winning play, W;t, offer portraits of dying professionals—a lawyer and 
an academic—who look back on their lives and are not happy with  the 
conventional ambitions that they have pursued.52  Though both works can 
make for painful reading, they bring home in powerful ways the importance of 
thinking, at the beginning of a career, what would seem valuable at the end.  A 
similar message comes through from Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the 
Day, a moving account of a butler’s professional role and moral compromise, 
which has generated a rich secondary legal literature.53 A more uplifting 
narrative is Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons.  It offers a heroic profile of 
Sir Thomas More, a lawyer willing to die for his principles, surrounded by 
others prepared to trade their integrity for personal advance.54  Excerpts from 
films of these works can supplement or substitute for readings. 
Case histories and biographies can similarly supply the kind of thick 
description that enriches understanding of professional roles.  Legal Ethics 
Stories offers rich narratives on a range of well-known cases.55  Celebrated 
securities scandals including National Securities Marketing and Enron have 
generated novels, documentaries, and accompanying teaching materials that 
vividly demonstrate the cognitive biases and organizational pathologies noted 
earlier.56  By contrast, profiles of professional courage by American lawyers, 
 
TEACHING AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION (1989); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S 
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990); JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS 
OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994); James Boyd 
White, Teaching Law and Literature, 27 MOSAIC 1 (1994).  For a collection of short stories that 
are relevant to legal ethics, see LAWRENCE J. FOX, LEGAL TENDER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO 
HANDLING PROFESSIONAL DILEMMAS (1995).  For a symposium on stories relevant to legal 
ethics, see Symposium, Case Studies in Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2001). 
 52. LEO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH (Ann Pasternak Slater trans., Random 
House, Inc. 2003) (1886); MARGARET EDSON, W;T (1999). 
 53. KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989); see Rob Atkinson, How the 
Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE 
L.J. 177 (1995) (discussing The Remains of the Day); David Luban, Steven’s Professionalism and 
Ours, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 297 (1996) (same); W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: 
The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161 (1996) (same). 
 54. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962).  For a description of how to present 
character-related lessons from literary portraits such as A Man for All Seasons, see JOSEPH L. 
BADARACCO, JR., QUESTIONS OF CHARACTER: ILLUMINATING THE HEART OF LEADERSHIP 
THROUGH LITERATURE 142–59 (2006). 
 55. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS STORIES (2006). 
 56. For a discussion of the National Student Marketing scandal, see ARTHUR R. G. 
SOLMSSEN, THE COMFORT LETTER (1975), which was discussed in Richard W. Painter, 
Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1113–21 (2001).  For a discussion of the Enron scandal, see ENRON: 
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 
2004); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
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such as John Adams, Charles Houston, Abraham Lincoln, and Thurgood 
Marshall, can provide positive models of moral decision-making, and in forms 
more nuanced and memorable than conventional analytic approaches.57 
Similar payoffs may come from integration of interdisciplinary and 
practitioner perspectives.  Materials and experts from business, medical, 
journalistic, or engineering ethics give students a window into their own 
profession and frequently serve to jog otherwise unchallenged assumptions on 
issues like confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and third-party responsibilities.  
Courses that combine students and faculty from different disciplines offer 
particularly valuable settings to explore cross-cutting ethical concerns and 
prepare participants for an increasingly multidisciplinary legal landscape.58  
Visitors from practice can also be excellent if they are candid and self-
reflective and if they prepare something beyond war stories.  Involving them as 
participants rather than lecturers can minimize the risks of turning the course 
into Anecdote 101.59 
Strategies for encouraging adequate class preparation are also important.  
Unlike other more technical subject matter, which cannot be understood unless 
students have done the reading, ethical issues are relatively accessible.  This 
has the obvious advantage of permitting broad class participation, but the 
equally obvious disadvantage of reducing students’ incentives to prepare.  The 
problem is compounded if professors compensate by summarizing the assigned 
materials.  A more effective option can be to require short weekly reflection 
papers in lieu of an exam.  If the class is a manageable size, professors can 
comment on these papers on a regular basis.  Alternatively, students can form 
teams and comment on each others’ papers.  At the end of the semester, the 
 
 57. For a discussion of Thurgood Marshall, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 
219–24 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: 
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994).  For a discussion of 
Charles Houston, see Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston: Social Engineer for Civil 
Rights, in BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 221–39 (John Hope Franklin & 
August Meier eds., 1982).  For other examples, including discussions of Hamilton and Lincoln, 
see Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 35, at 1243–45.  For a discussion of the 
courage of southern judges in implementing civil rights decisions, see JACK BASS, UNLIKELY 
HEROES (1981).  For a discussion of the value of modeling virtue through example, see 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981). 
 58. For examples of such approaches, see Erin A. Egan, Kayhan Parsi & Cynthia Ramirez, 
Comparing Ethics Education in Medicine and Law: Combining the Best of Both Worlds, 13 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 303, 316 (2004); Girth, supra note 42, at 612–14; David B. Wilkins, 
Redefining the “Professional” in Professional Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching 
Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1995). 
 59. For a description of a systematic effort to involve the organized bar, see Lois R. Lupica, 
Professional Responsibility Redesigned: Sparking a Dialogue Between Students and the Bar, 29 
J. LEGAL PROF. 71 (2005). 
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professor can then read each student’s file or a selected sample of the papers.  
Needless to say, that is a time-consuming process and will not work if the class 
is too large.  But the advantage is that it produces a better quality of discussion 
throughout the semester and rewards the students who take the material 
seriously. 
Finally, we could do more to assess the effectiveness of our teaching 
strategies.  Course evaluations at the end of the semester give relatively little 
information about how well we are preparing graduates for the issues they will 
confront in practice.  Law schools have done far too little to address the large 
knowledge vacuum about the legal profession they launch.60  Our educational 
approaches could benefit from systematic research, or even informal surveys of 
alumni or continuing legal education participants, about what has been or 
would be most useful from professional responsibility courses. 
One central paradox in teaching those courses is that if our strategies have 
been at all successful, students may end up with more questions than they had 
when they began.  That is not why they came to law school.  But it is 
unavoidable in professional responsibility classes that focus on the ethical 
questions most worth discussing, where there are strong competing values and 
interests at issue.  On those questions, there may be no single “right” answer, 
but some are more right than others.  A central goal of the course is to help 
students reason about those issues in ways that are responsive to the full range 
of relevant concerns and opposing views. 
Another strategy, and a point on which the course can close, is to remind 
future practitioners of the opportunities and obligations that come with 
membership in a largely self-regulating profession.  Lawyers have 
considerable power over the terms of their own practice and a range of ways to 
leave the world slightly better than they found it.  The same is, of course, true 
of law professors, especially those who teach legal ethics.  The nature of the 
subject matter imposes special obligations on faculty to consider whether they 
are modeling the principles they preach in their professional conduct and 
public service.61  This, of course, adds to the challenges for professors who are 
 
 60. See David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study 
and Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, The 
Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 26 (1999).  For two 
of the only published studies of graduates’ responses to questions about professional ethics 
education, see Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3; James E. Moliterno, Professional 
Preparedness: A Comparative Study of Law Graduates’ Perceived Readiness for Professional 
Ethics Issues, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (1995). 
 61. As Cramton and Koniak put it, “Do we mouth principles or mean them?”  Cramton & 
Koniak, supra note 4, at 193; see also Lerman, supra note 15, at 479; Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, 
Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991).  For a 
representative summary of appropriate practices, see Statement of Good Practices by Law 
Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, in ASSOCIATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1997 HANDBOOK 89–94 (1997).  For discussion of how faculty 
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already taking on a difficult teaching task.  But students pick up messages in 
subtexts as well as texts, and faculty members’ own commitments inevitably 
become part of the educational process.  Those who profess on professional 
responsibility have a special responsibility to inspire students and each other to 
live up to their own best sense of what legal ethics requires. 
 
too often fall short, see Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 70 (2006).  For faculty members’ pro bono responsibilities, see RHODE, supra note 14, at 
169–71; David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58 
(1999). 
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